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INDEPENDENT CRAFT BREWERIES STRUGGLE
UNDER DISTRIBUTION LAWS THAT CREATE A
POWER IMBALANCE IN FAVOR OF
WHOLESALERS
DANIEL CROXALL*
ABSTRACT
Independent craft breweries are facing historic challenges
under the COVID-19 pandemic. To make matters worse, many
states prohibit a brewery from terminating a distribution contract
with a wholesaler absent statutorily defined “good cause,” which
typically means fraud, bankruptcy, or other illegal conduct. In this
context, lagging sales or poor distribution performance are not
grounds for a brewery to terminate a distribution contract. This
means that it is nearly impossible, legally or financially, for an
independent craft brewery to terminate a distribution contract
with an unsatisfactory wholesaler. In essence, states have statutorily tipped the balance of power in favor of distributors over independent craft breweries based on the allegations that large beer
manufacturers have too much bargaining power over distributors.
One size does not fit all. Indeed, California is currently entertaining a bill to move from a more permissive relationship between
breweries and distributors (allowing for termination generally) to
a much more strict good cause model that other states have adopted.
States must re-evaluate their distribution laws and reject good
cause standards that tie a small brewery to a distributor in perpetuity. Stated plainly, good cause distribution statutes harm independent craft breweries, competition, and ultimately consumers.

Daniel J. Croxall is an Associate Professor of Lawyering Skills at the
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. He teaches the world’s first
craft beer law class at a law school. Professor Croxall thanks Thomas Gerhart
for his invaluable research and insights in support of this Article.
*
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INTRODUCTION
Something is rotten when it comes to beer distribution—
especially for independent craft brewers.1 Numerous states artificially tip the balance of power between manufacturers and
distributors, in favor of distributors, through the laws governing
their distribution contracts.2 These laws essentially provide a distributor a property right in their distribution contracts to protect
their investment; however, they also leave the manufacturer at the
mercy of the distributor, even if such a contract is no longer a good
fit or the distributor performs in a subpar manner.3 This is particularly challenging for the thousands of independent craft
breweries throughout the nation. Current statutes make it all but
impossible for an independent craft brewery to terminate—legally
or financially—a distribution contract after execution.4 There is
no justification for protectionist laws that benefit one tier of the
industry, distributors, at the expense of another, independent
manufacturers. In fact, such laws often harm consumers, who
ultimately end up with less variety and higher prices.5
As set forth below, distributors enjoy varying levels of protection from their given states to the detriment of independent craft
breweries. Breweries can most often only terminate distribution
The Brewers Association is the national trade group for craft breweries.
It defines an independent craft brewery as requiring, among other things,
that “[l]ess than 25 percent of the craft brewery is owned or controlled (or
equivalent economic interest) by a beverage alcohol industry member that is
not itself a craft brewer.” Craft Brewer Definition, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.
brewersassociation.org/statistics-and-data/craft-brewer-definition/ [https://perma
.cc/8XR5-GHQ2].
2 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2553(a), (c) (West 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 18B-1305(d)(4) (West 2019).
3 See Letter from Bilal K. Sayyed, Director, FTC Off. of Pol’y Plan., et al.,
to Jim Wood, Assembly Member, California State (Mar. 20, 2020) [hereinafter
Sayyed FTC Letter], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_doc
uments/joint-comment-ftc-staff-doj-antitrust-division-staff-california-state-as
sembly-concerning-california/v200008_california_beer_distribution_advocacy
_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/E693-SJJ9] (explaining that good cause requirements have a disparate impact on small brewers and that implementing such
requirements will be detrimental to the state’s brewing industry).
4 See id.
5 See id.
1
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contracts for statutorily defined “good cause.”6 People are commonly
surprised to find out that good cause in the beer manufacturerdistributor context does not include highly relevant and practical
considerations such as sales quotas, performance standards, or
satisfaction of general contractual duties.7 Instead, good cause
in most states typically means bankruptcy, fraud, or other illegal conduct.8 Under these laws, breweries are stuck with their
distributors in perpetuity, unless they can legally terminate the
contract which usually involves paying the distributor the fair
market value of the contract.9 Of course, very few, if any, independent breweries can handle such an expense.10 This can leave
small breweries in the untenable position of either sticking with
an underperforming distributor or taking on further debt to terminate the contract and move on to a more fitting distributor.11
The growing diversity of manufacturers and products in
the beer industry has severely diminished the policy rationale
that originally, arguably, justified the protectionism afforded to
distributors—especially with respect to independent craft brewers.12 As set forth more fully below, the traditional justification
for distributors receiving legislatively created contractual protections is simply that large beer manufacturers wield too much power
over distributors.13 Big Beer truly is big: “Anheuser-Busch [now AB
InBev] is believed to control, directly or indirectly, over 50 percent of all beer sold in this country.”14 While that might be true,
there are only a few “Big” breweries, but there are literally thousands of very small breweries in the United States. The Alcohol and
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2553(a), (c); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18B1305(a), (d)(4).
7 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2553; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18B-1305.
8 See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18B-1305(c).
9 Mike Drumm, Beer Distribution Agreements, BEER ATT’Y (May 14, 2019),
https://beerattorney.com/blog/beer-distribution-agreements/ [https://perma.cc
/4ZJG-M89V] (explaining that the ambiguous term “fair market value,” with
regard to terminating a beer distribution agreement, typically ranges from
three to five times the previous year’s gross margin).
10 See id.; Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3, at 9.
11 See Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3, at 2.
12 Id.
13 Barry Kurtz & Bryan H. Clements, Beer Distribution Law as Compared
to Traditional Franchise Law, 33 FRANCHISE L.J. 397, 399 (2014).
14 Id.
6
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Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, the federal agency charged with
overseeing breweries and other alcohol manufacturers, found that
roughly 75% of the 6,400 breweries operating last year produced
1,000 barrels or less.15 For context, only fifteen breweries in the
United States brewed more than 6,000,000 barrels of beer, only
twelve breweries brewed between 500,001 and 1,000,000 barrels,
and 4,577 brewed between one and 1,000 barrels.16 As with most
things in life, one size does not fit all, nor does it make sense, like
legislatively protecting distributors from Big Beer manufacturers’
market power at the steep expense of small, independent breweries.
Since Congress passed the Twenty-First Amendment to
the United States Constitution, individual states regulate the
beer industry through individualized statutory schemes.17 When
states took the reins over alcohol, three types of alcoholic beverage regulatory schemes emerged: prohibition, licensing, and monopoly.18 Kansas, Mississippi, and Oklahoma were the only states
that continued to prohibit alcohol in the post-Prohibition era.19
Licensing states adopted a three-tiered system that separated
the manufacture (brewers), distribution (wholesalers), and retail
tiers to protect the market from unfair trade practices that stifle
competition.20 Monopoly states also utilized a three-tier system,
but those states exercised a public monopoly over the sale of beer
for off-premises consumption.21 Regardless of whether a state uses
a licensing or monopoly system today, nearly every state regulates
the brewer-distributor relationship.22 Whether styled as licensing
ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE BUREAU, NUMBER OF BREWERS
PRODUCTION SIZE—CY 2019 (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.ttb.gov/images
/pdfs/statistics/production_size/2019_brew_prod_size_ttb_gov.pdf [https://perma
.cc/M2TX-NB2P]. For reference, a barrel of beer contains two kegs’ worth of beer.
16 Id.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2; Thomas A. Gerhart, Undermining the
Law: How Uninformed Legislating Helps Big Beer Erode California’s Tied-House
Laws, 51 U. PAC. L. REV. 25, 30 (2019).
18 A.H. MARTIN, JR. & E.E. MCCLEISH, THE MKTG. LAWS SURVEY, STATE
LIQUOR LEGISLATION 21 (1941).
19 Id. at 21, n.10.
20 See Gerhart, supra note 17, at 30.
21 See MARTIN & MCCLEISH, supra note 18, at 25.
22 See Marc E. Sorini, Beer Franchise Law Summary, BREWERS ASS’N (2014),
https://www.brewersassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Beer-Franchise
-Law-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/6K6S-MJW5].
15
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or monopoly systems, the hurdles contemporary laws present to
independent craft brewers in terms of getting out of a harmful
distribution contract are, in a word, insurmountable.23
As set forth below, California and many other states use a
licensing system that gives independent breweries more leeway
to negotiate a contract cancellation.24 The majority of states use
a more restrictive distribution scheme known colloquially in the
beer community as “beer franchise laws.”25 Beer franchise laws
essentially dictate the key terms of any distribution contract, such
as what constitutes good cause to terminate a contract, and make
it virtually impossible for a manufacturer to get out of a contract.26
California serves as an important case study. Recent legislation
in California, backed by the distributors’ lobby, seeks to convert
California’s current, more permissive regulatory framework to a
strict franchise law model with respect to distribution, as has
been adopted by other states.27 As set forth below, there is simply
no justifiable basis for making such a change.28
Following Prohibition, states slowly began regulating the
brewer-distributor relationship.29 State laws regulating the relationship between a brewer and a distributor have diverged into
three distinct categories.30 The majority of states prohibit a brewer
from terminating a distribution agreement unless it satisfies
statutory “good cause” requirements.31 While a bit of a misnomer, this Article refers to them as “pure franchise laws” with respect to the beer industry. Traditional franchise laws and the
colloquially named beer franchise laws are not the same thing, and
See generally Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3.
See id.; Kurtz & Clements, supra note 13, at 400–01.
25 See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 13, at 397–99 (noting similarities and
differences between true franchise laws and beer distribution laws); see also
Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3; Sorini, supra note 22.
26 See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 13, at 402–07.
27 See Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3, at 1, 6–8; Sorini, supra note 22.
28 See generally Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3.
29 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7 (West 2020) (beginning in
2000, instituting the first and only limitation on terminating beer distribution agreements in California).
30 See Jeffrey M. Glazer, Starting a Brewery: A Web of Regulations, 89
WIS. LAW. 20, 21, 24 (2016); Sorini, supra note 22.
31 See Sorini, supra note 22; e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, §§ 1454–55
(West 2019) (requiring ninety-day notice, time to cure, and good cause—or
loss of license, insolvency, or noncompliance).
23
24
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most states regulate franchises, fast-food restaurants for example, differently than beer distributors.32 A growing minority of
states require some form of good cause, and they utilize a variety
of other means to regulate beer distribution laws.33 Only two
states and the District of Columbia have not enacted any beer
franchise laws.34
In its 1941 study, the Works Progress Administration noted
how alcohol legislation—if applied to other industries—would be
unconstitutional.35 States originally embraced freedom of contract and largely left beer distribution agreements unregulated.36
Over time, however, distributors lobbied states to limit a brewer’s ability to terminate a distribution agreement on the basis that
Big Beer has too much power over distributors.37 The distributors’
ultimate goal is for states to implement a good cause requirement before a brewer can terminate a beer distribution agreement—and the majority of states have done so.38 Such statutory
contractual terms are harmful to independent breweries and the
consuming public alike.39
As briefly mentioned above, beer franchise laws implemented
the good cause standard to correct a seeming imbalance in bargaining power between brewers and distributors.40 Unfortunately,
See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 13, at 397; Sorini, supra note 22.
See, e.g., Glazer, supra note 30, at 24 (observing that a brewer in Wisconsin can usually terminate a distribution agreement “for any, or no, reason”);
see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37A, § 3-111(F)(1) (West 2018) (exempting small
brewers from good cause requirements).
34 See Sorini, supra note 22 (identifying Alaska and Hawaii as the only
states that do not regulate beer franchise law).
35 See MARTIN & MCCLEISH, supra note 18, at 19 (reasoning that selling
alcohol is “not an inherent right, but [it] is subject to the ... legitimate exercise of [state] police power”).
36 Compare 1933 Cal. Stat. 1707 (enacting California’s first alcohol laws in
1933), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7 (West 2020) (becoming California’s
restriction on terminating a beer distribution agreement in 2000).
37 See, e.g., S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 1957, at 1–3 (Cal. Aug. 29,
2000) (noting that the California Beer and Beverage Distributors—an industry trade group—sponsored SB 1957 to counterbalance disparate bargaining
power between brewers and distributors).
38 See Sorini, supra note 22.
39 See generally Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3.
40 See Sorini, supra note 22.
32
33
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that standard goes too far because it indefinitely binds a brewery, regardless of size or actual bargaining power, to a distributor.41 The good cause standard has a disparate impact on the
craft brewing industry because, unlike large manufacturers,
small manufacturers lack the financial resources to buy their way
out of a distribution contract.42 Further, the purpose of beer franchise statutes is to protect a distributor from catastrophic failure
because of the loss of a single, large manufacturer;43 frankly, this
is not a realistic concern in contracts between independent craft
breweries and distributors.44 Put simply, states must reevaluate
their beer franchise laws and move away from the good cause
requirement to properly balance distribution agreements between independent craft brewers and distributors.45
I.RELEVANT BREWING INDUSTRY AND DISTRIBUTION BACKGROUND
The brewing industry experienced two significant changes
between 1970 and today that impacted the brewer-distributor relationship.46 Section I.A explains how large manufacturers developed a global beer industry but surrendered domestic market share
along the way.47 Section I.B describes the increase in large manufacturer-friendly legislation that paralleled large manufacturers’
loss in domestic market share.48 Section I.C describes some basics
of beer distribution and the brewery-distributor relationship.49
See generally Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3.
Id.
43 Evan Pitchford, Relationships Between Producers, Wholesalers, and Retailers: Beer Distribution and Franchise Laws in California (Part 2), CONKLE,
KREMER & ENGEL PROF. L. CORP., https://www.conklelaw.com/relationships-be
tween-producers-wholesalers-and-retailers-beer-distribution-and-franchise-laws
-in-california-part-2 [https://perma.cc/G7BK-9WCU].
44 See Gerhart, supra note 17, at 28 (showing seventy-one large manufacturers earned 58% of total retail sales in 2017 compared to 6,266 craft brewers splitting 23% of retail sales); Drumm, supra note 9 (explaining that the
ambiguous term “fair market value,” with regard to terminating a beer distribution agreement, typically ranges from three to five times the previous
year’s gross margin).
45 See generally Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3.
46 Infra Sections I.A, I.B.
47 Infra Section I.A.
48 Infra Section I.B.
49 Infra Section I.C.
41
42

2021]

INDEPENDENT CRAFT BREWERIES

409

A. Domestic Dominance to Globalization
In preparation for the Twenty-First Amendment, states enacted alcoholic beverage control acts, and many pre-Prohibition
brewers resumed production.50 More than 900 breweries opened
after Congress passed the Twenty-First Amendment.51 By 1983,
there were less than 100 breweries operating in the United States,
and six companies produced 92% of all domestic beer.52 Between
1983–1998, the number of breweries in the United States jumped
from 80 to 1500.53 While the number of brewers increased, large
manufacturers’ market share of production decreased by 20%
between 1983–2018.54 Additionally, the price of beer fell nearly
$1.00 per pint between 1975–1990.55
After 2000, a wave of mergers and acquisitions globalized
the brewing industry.56 The globalization began with InBev’s
2008 purchase of Anheuser-Busch, creating AB InBev—a brewery
that was twice the size of its nearest competitor.57 As of 2014, the
world’s ten largest brewers controlled nearly 70% of the global
brewing industry and four brewers made up 47% of that figure.58
AB InBev purchased SAB Miller in 2018 and controlled about
Compare, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (ratified on December 5, 1933),
with 1933 Cal. Stat. 1707 (approved on June 3, 1933 and becoming effective
“[i]f and when it shall become lawful under the Constitution and laws of the
United States to manufacture, sell, ... intoxicating liquors”); see also Mapping
the American Brewing Renaissance, VINEPAIR, https://vinepair.com/map-ameri
can-craft-brewing-history/ [https://perma.cc/JV94-5KBP].
51 Mapping the American Brewing Renaissance, supra note 50.
52 History of American Beer, BEERADVOCATE, https://www.beeradvocate
.com/beer/101/history_american_beer/ [https://perma.cc/9JJW-SEUA].
53 Id.; Mapping the American Brewing Renaissance, supra note 50.
54 History of American Beer, supra note 52; ALCOHOL & TOBACCO TAX &
TRADE BUREAU, NUMBER OF BREWERS BY PRODUCTION SIZE—CY 2018 (Apr. 4,
2019), https://www.ttb.gov/images/pdfs/statistics/production_size/2018_brew
_prod_size_ttb_gov.pdf [https://perma.cc/JH9Z-JPDV].
55 Jay Brooks, The Price of a Beer: 1952–2016, BROOKSTON BEER BULL.
(Mar. 9, 2017), https://brookstonbeerbulletin.com/the-price-of-a-beer-1952-2016
[https://perma.cc/QND8-RZEC].
56 Erik Strøjer Madsen & Yanqing Wu, Globalization of Brewing and
Economies of Scale 2 (Aarhus Univ. Sch. of Bus. and Soc. Scis., Econ. Working
Paper No. 2014-23, 2014), http://pure.au.dk/portal/files/81993423/wp14_23
.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3SE-MV5D].
57 Id. at 5–6.
58 Id. at 6.
50
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27% of the global beer market in 2019.59 Finally, AB InBev produces
approximately 50% of all beer in the United States today.60
Further, the distribution tier is experiencing increased
consolidation.61 More specifically, “wholesalers now include both
large vertically integrated firms, such as distributors owned by
Anheuser Busch, and large horizontally integrated firms, such
as the six California wholesale firms that are part of the Reyes Beer
Division of Reyes Holdings, Inc.”62 Reyes Holdings, Inc. is the largest beer distributor in the United States.63 To illustrate, “[w]ith
recent California acquisitions, Reyes is estimated to distribute
nearly 100 million cases of beer per year in California—
approximately one-third of all the beer sold in California.”64 Distribution consolidation is not a California phenomenon and is
occurring nationwide.65 Given the difficulty of an independent
craft brewery getting its product to market, this consolidation
only makes it harder for the little guy.66 And distributor consolidation weakens the argument that distributors need statutory
contract protections for fear of closing up shop in the event a
single brewery terminates a distribution contract.67
B. Increased Legislative Activity
During the period when large manufacturers’ domestic
market share declined, a wave of legislative changes began to shape
states’ beer laws in ways that favored one subset of the brewing
Analyzing the Global Beer Industry 2019—ResearchAndMarkets.com,
BUS. WIRE (Sept. 9, 2019, 11:41 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home
/20190909005737/en/Analyzing-Global-Beer-Industry-2019---ResearchAnd
Markets.com [https://perma.cc/EF6J-UTG4].
60 Adam Davidson, Are We in Danger of a Beer Monopoly?, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 26, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/magazine/beer-mergers
.html [https://perma.cc/S49V-JBJQ].
61 Analyzing the Global Beer Industry 2019—ResearchAndMarkets.com,
supra note 59.
62 Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3, at 5 (internal citations omitted).
63 See id.
64 Id.
65 Anton Popov, Distribution Consolidation and Pricing in the Beer Industry,
2 (Aug. 25, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://economics.mit
.edu/files/17765 [https://perma.cc/2YWG-WWV9].
66 Id. at 5.
67 Id.
59
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industry—large manufacturers.68 Many states’ first changes to
their beer laws coincided with large manufacturers’ decline in
domestic market share.69 Even today, large manufacturers are
seeking legislative exceptions that would give them a market
advantage by legalizing pay-to-play activities.70
While large manufacturers were working on regaining
market dominance, distributors began to voice concern that their
manufacturing counterparts overpowered the brewer-distributor
relationship.71 For example, in 2000, the California Beer and
Beverage Distributors (CBBD) lobbied for, proposed, and succeeded in passing legislation that regulated California’s beer
distribution agreements for the first time.72 The CBBD proposed
this law because “beer manufacturers have enjoyed ever increasing market power over their distributors.”73 That justification
holds no water.
Although this law prohibits a brewer from terminating a
distribution agreement for its distributor’s failure to meet an
unreasonable sales quota, the law failed to accomplish its objective.74 More specifically, California Business and Professions
Code section 25000.7 states,
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of any agreement for the sale
or distribution of beer between a beer manufacturer and beer
wholesaler, no sale or distribution agreement shall be terminated solely for a beer wholesaler’s failure to meet a sales goal or
E.g., Gerhart, supra note 17, at 33–34 (discussing four legislative exceptions that favor large manufacturers enacted by California between 1971 and
1990).
69 E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 25500–25512 (West 2020) (noting California had not added or amended any statutes until 1973, but it has added at least
19 new statutes and amended existing statutes at least 126 times since 1973).
70 Compare id. § 25600.05 (enacted by Chapter 623) (creating an exception
to California’s beer laws that permits manufacturers to give glassware to retail
locations—despite former Governor Brown vetoing a similar bill the previous
year), with Letter from Jerry Brown, Governor, Cal. State, to Cal. State Assembly
(Sept. 6, 2018) (“I also worry that this law creates an economic disadvantage for
small beer manufactures [sic]”).
71 S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 1957, at 1–3 (Cal. Aug. 29, 2000).
72 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7 (enacted by SB 1957 in 2000); S.
RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 1957, at 4–5 (Cal. Aug. 29, 2000).
73 S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 1957, at 4.
74 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7.
68
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quota that is not commercially reasonable under the prevailing market conditions.75

Section 25000.7 thus presents large manufacturers with a
relatively small obstacle by discouraging them from terminating
a beer distribution agreement.76 However, large manufacturers
can still operate with impunity and behave as if the law did not
exist.77 Today, large manufacturers use their resources to terminate—or effectively terminate—beer distribution agreements
simply by paying the distributor to go away (a luxury few, if any,
independent craft breweries can afford), which prompted distributors to lobby the Legislature for changes that impact all
brewers.78 While large manufacturers’ conduct was the catalyst
for those changes, the impact of distributors’ proposed changes
are strangling to many craft brewers.79
C. Beer Distribution Basics
Manufacturers make beer; wholesalers distribute it to the
various retail outlets the consuming public enjoy such as bars,
restaurants, and other venues.80 Distributors take the beer from
Id. § 2500.7(a).
See id.
77 Jessica Infante, Reyes Makes 3rd California Wholesaler Acquisition of 2019
with W.A. Thompson Deal, BREWBOUND (Oct. 8, 2019, 5:25 PM), https://www.
brewbound.com/news/reyes-makes-3rd-california-wholesaler-acquisition-of-2019
-with-w-a-thompson-deal (last visited Feb. 12, 2021); Justin Kendall, Reyes Beverage Acquires Another 4 Million Cases of Constellation Business in Southern
California, BREWBOUND (Oct. 22, 2018, 4:47 PM) [hereinafter Reyes Beverage],
https://www.brewbound.com/news/reyes-beverage-acquires-another-4-million
-cases-of-constellation-business-in-southern-california (last visited Feb. 12, 2021).
78 E.g., Justin Kendall, Constellation Brands Forces Distributor Change in
Northern San Diego County, BREWBOUND (June 7, 2018, 5:20 PM) [hereinafter
Constellation Brands], https://www.brewbound.com/news/constellation-brands
-forces-distributor-change-northern-san-diego-county (last visited Feb. 12, 2021)
(explaining that Constellation Brands asked its distributor to terminate the
distribution agreement—against the distributor’s best interest—and the distributor complied only to avoid a lengthy legal battle).
79 Reyes Beverage, supra note 77.
80 Marc Sorini, Understanding the Three-Tier System: Its Impacts on U.S.
Craft Beer and You, CRAFTBEER.COM (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.craftbeer.com
/craft-beer-muses/three-tier-system-impacts-craft-beer [https://perma.cc/7X
H5-RKUH].
75
76
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the manufacturer and mark the price up to make their profits.81
Distributors must be licensed by their respective state agencies
to engage in distribution.82 In practical terms, a manufacturer
loses roughly 30% in profit per packaged item to the distributor
that the manufacturer would otherwise realize in a direct to
consumer transaction.83
In exchange, the distributor is responsible for caring for
the brewer’s product in terms of quality control, storage, handling, and delivery.84 In addition, distributors have to move the
beer—they have to “establish retail networks to sell the brands
of beer that they carry.”85 Large manufacturers handle their
own advertising at national and regional levels, but distributors
“often provide point-of-sale promotion like enhanced product
placement, setting up displays, conducting in-store events, and
supplying retailers with information on the brands they represent.”86 Thus, distributors provide a much needed service to
breweries seeking to expand retail presence.87 At its core, independent craft breweries only enter into a distribution contract to
move more beer and expand sales.88 Yet, in most states, lack of
sales or movement of product is not good cause for a manufacturer to terminate a contract.89
Under modern statutes, distributors typically receive certain
contractual protections.90 While the exact protections vary among
the states, they typically boil down to three main categories.91
First, nearly every state provides that the brewery-distributor
Kary Shumway, How Do You Determine the Price of a Craft Beer? (Price
to Distributor, Price to Retailer and Price to Consumer), CRAFT BREWING BUS.
(Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.craftbrewingbusiness.com/business-marketing
/determine-price-craft-beer-price-distributor-price-retailer-price-consumer/
[https://perma.cc/S7LG-ZN67].
82 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7 (West 2020).
83 Shumway, supra note 81.
84 See Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3, at 5.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 10.
88 Id. at 11.
89 Id. at 7.
90 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 25000.7, 25000.9 (West 2020).
91 See, e.g., id. §§ 25000.5, 25000.7, 25000.9.
81
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relationship is exclusive to the parties to the contract.92 That means
that once the contract is executed, the brewery cannot allow another distributor to move its product within the bounds of the
agreed upon geography—these are known as territorial protections.93 Second, distributors are often given transfer protections.94
Transfer protections limit the brewer’s ability to prevent distributors from transferring their rights to another distributor (think
consolidation).95 Typically, brewers can be civilly liable for damages
if they unreasonably withhold consent to the transfer.96 Lastly,
and most importantly to this Article, distributors typically receive
termination protections in which a brewery cannot terminate the
contract without statutorily defined good cause.97 In practice, this
means that if a brewery wants to terminate a contract, it is typically required to pay an X-modifier, usually three times annual
gross, before the distributor will agree to termination.98
II.DEFINING THE PROBLEM
The problem is a legislatively created power imbalance in
favor of distributors at the expense of independent craft breweries.99
After years of unchanged statutory and regulatory schemes, the
brewing industry is undergoing a transformation.100 Large manufacturers are using their resources to drive legislative changes,
which gives them advantages over their craft counterparts.101 Distributors reacted to large manufacturers terminating, or effectively
terminating, distribution agreements by pursuing legislation
that would bind all brewers.102 Craft brewers lack the resources
See, e.g., id. § 25000.5.
See id.
94 See, e.g., id. § 25000.9.
95 See id.
96 See id.
97 See, e.g., id. § 25000.7.
98 See Constellation Brands, supra note 78.
99 See Gerhart, supra note 17, at 28.
100 Id.
101 See, e.g., id. at 36 n.105, 37 n.108 (citing Letter from Thomas M. Hannigan,
Assembly Member, Cal. State, to George Deukmejian, Governor, Cal. State
(May 25, 1990) (asking the legislature to enact a law to legitimize an illegal act
that MillerCoors and Marine World had unknowingly engaged in sixteen years)).
102 See, e.g., A.B. 1541, 2019–2020 State Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 98 (Cal.
2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted) (proposing to enact a
92
93
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to effectively defend themselves against these lobbies and, in both
instances, large manufacturers end up harming craft brewers.103
States across the nation have been working to find a middle
ground between large manufacturers and craft brewers, but distributors are also weighing in on the discussion.104 In California,
the distribution lobby imprecisely identified the problem as stemming from the disparity in bargaining power between brewers
and distributors.105 This generalization failed to account for situations where the distributor has greater bargaining power in distribution contracts, as is the case for the majority of craft brewers.106
The CBBD’s first attempt to correct the imbalance resulted
in a law that places a minor limitation on brewers and avoids the
issue of good cause altogether.107 Nearly twenty years after California enacted its first beer franchise law restriction, the CBBD
asked Assembly Member Adam Gray to propose a new restriction
with the same justification the CBBD used in 2000.108 At the
CBBD’s request, Assembly Member Gray introduced Assembly Bill
(AB) 1541 in the California Legislature on February 22, 2019.109
This bill embodies the debate at hand: what beer laws properly
good cause standard that would prevent a brewer from terminating a beer
distribution agreement unless the brewer satisfies a four-pronged test).
103 See Reyes Beverage, supra note 77 (showing how large manufacturers
leverage their resources to terminate beer distribution agreements); Telephone Interview with the Office of Assembly Member Adam Gray, Cal. State
(Jan. 27, 2020) [hereinafter Gray Telephone Interview] (notes on file with the
author) (citing Constellation’s termination of that agreement as a cause to
propose a good cause requirement for terminating beer distribution agreements in California); see also Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Director,
FTC, et al., to Wesley Chesbro, Senator, Cal. State (Aug. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Ohlhausen FTC Letter] (cautioning the California Legislature against
enacting a good cause requirement because such requirements harm smaller
breweries and can reduce competition and increase the price of beer).
104 Baylen Linnekin, Bad State Laws and Big Money Beer Wholesalers Are
Still Hurting Craft Brewers, REASON (Mar. 16, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://reason
.com/2019/03/16/bad-state-laws-and-big-money-beer-wholes/ [https://perma.cc
/WGF2-2SZ9].
105 S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 1957, at 3–4 (Cal. Aug. 29, 2000).
106 Id.
107 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7(a)–(b) (West 2020).
108 Gray Telephone Interview, supra note 103.
109 CAL. LEGIS. INFO., BILL HISTORY AB-1541, https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov
/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB1541 [https://perma.cc
/ZZ6A-J8NW].
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balance the brewer-distributor relationship in a way that does
not disparately impact craft brewers?110
AB 1541 is emblematic of the fight that has occurred or is
occurring in all states, distributors seeking to change the law in
their favor at the expense of independent brewers.111 AB 1541
attempts to bolster California’s already strict termination protections in favor of distributors.112 California’s current termination
protection merely provides that missing sales goals or quotas do
not constitute “good cause” for a brewery to terminate a contract.113
However, AB 1541 provides that a beer manufacturer cannot terminate, or decline to renew, a distribution contract unless
the beer manufacturer acts in “good faith” and with “good cause”
and the brewer has allowed for notice and cure opportunities.114
What is worse is that the burden falls on the manufacturer to
show that it has acted in good faith and with good cause.115 Finally, in an overlay draconian twist, AB 1541 provides that the
brewer must establish that:
(1) There is a failure by the beer wholesaler, without reasonable excuse or justification, to comply substantially with essential
and commercially reasonable requirements of the agreement....
(2) The beer wholesaler was given written notice by the beer
manufacturer of failure to comply with the agreement, including reasonable supporting documentation.
(3) The beer manufacturer first acquired knowledge of the
failure described in paragraph (1) not more than __ months
before the date notification was given to the beer wholesaler.
(4) The beer wholesaler has been afforded __ days in which to
submit a plan of corrective action ....116

According to the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice Antitrust Division, “[a] manufacturer, including
a craft brewer, could not even decline to renew a contract with a
S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 1957, at 4.
Id. at 4–5.
112 A.B. 1541, 2019–2020 State Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 98 (Cal. 2019) (as
amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted).
113 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7(a) (West 2020).
114 A.B. 1541, at 98.
115 Id.
116 Id.
110
111
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distributor whose performance it found unsatisfactory, without
satisfying all of the Bill’s ‘good cause’ requirements.”117 Stated
simply, under the proposed law and under the laws of many states,
the brewer-distributor relationship exists in perpetuity because
they are next to impossible to terminate.118
While the big lobbying efforts of Big Beer and Big Distribution—such as AB 1541—might play loudly to state legislators,
the independent brewer’s interest in new legislation has far less
money behind it, and the lack of representation results in the
adoption of harmful legislation.119 Independent craft brewers often rely on trade associations like the California Craft Brewers
Association (CCBA) to defend their interests in the state legislatures.120 Obviously, distributors and large manufacturers often
donate money to the legislators who introduce these bills and
chair committees the bills must pass.121
Current laws force craft brewers to choose between profits
or market exposure by limiting their distribution options to either
self-distribution or entering an ironclad pact with a distributor
for potentially eternity.122 While the CBBD’s initial assessment
came close to identifying the problem, it missed a critical qualifier.
The power balance exists between large manufacturers and distributors; legislative remedies that impact all brewers harm small
brewers and will have a dire impact on the brewing industry.123

Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3, at 7.
Id.
119 See Gerhart, supra note 17, at 28 (explaining that—in 2017—7 large
manufacturers earned $64.8 billion in retail sales compared to 6,266 craft
brewers splitting $26 billion); Linnekin, supra note 104.
120 About the CCBA, CAL. CRAFT BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.california
craftbeer.com/about-the-ccba/about-ccba-2/ [https://perma.cc/ZL4H-TC64].
121 E.g., Campaign Finance and Lobbying Activities, CAL. SEC’Y STATE, https://
www.sos.ca.gov/campaign-lobbying/ [https://perma.cc/Q26G-DM6B] (documenting that the CBBD has donated the maximum allowable campaign donations
to Assembly Member Gray and Senator Bill Dodd—the chairs for their houses’
respective governmental organization committees).
122 Linnekin, supra note 104.
123 See Ohlhausen FTC Letter, supra note 103, at 8 (explaining that good
cause requirements have a disparate impact on small brewers and that implementing such requirements will be detrimental to the state’s brewing industry).
117
118
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III.BEER FRANCHISE LAWS
Licensing states keep brewers, distributors, and retailers
separate and issue a multitude of licenses to the members of each
tier.124 States like California use a modified three-tier licensing
system that permits brewers to self-distribute but still keeps the
three tiers separate from one another.125 Monopoly states control
retail sales, thereby keeping brewers and distributors separate
from the retail tier.126 Despite these differences, licensing and
monopoly systems create circumstances where brewers may sell
their own products, either onsite or by self-distribution, or contract with a distributor to move their product.127 The system in
place does not impact beer franchise laws because both systems
carve out a specific place for the brewer-distributor relationship.128
Beyond adopting a licensing or monopoly model, states have
also developed their own bodies of law dealing with the relationship
between brewers and distributors.129 As noted above, the majority
of states require a brewer to have good cause before he or she can
terminate a distribution agreement.130 For a while, some states
opted to not regulate this relationship.131 Today, multiple minority
approaches have developed, and these approaches diverge from
the good cause requirement.132 Section III.A examines the good
MARTIN & MCCLEISH, supra note 18, at 21–25.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23357(a)–(d) (West 2020); CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 25500(f)(2)(A) (West 2020).
126 Compare, e.g., 47 PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 4-491(7) (West
2020) (“It shall be unlawful .... [f]or any manufacturer or licensed importer of
liquor in this Commonwealth ... to sell or offer to sell any liquor in this Commonwealth ....”), with VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-500(2) (West 2019) (defining a
“[b]eer wholesaler” and “beer distributor” as any wholesale license holder “offering beer for sale or resale to retailers”).
127 See Sorini, supra note 22.
128 E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-500(2).
129 Compare, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 436.1501–1547(1)–(6) (West
2020) (showing that Michigan is a licensing state), and N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 18B-1104(a1) (West 2019) (observing that, like Michigan, North Carolina is
a licensing state), with Sorini, supra note 22 (documenting that Michigan is a
good cause state and North Carolina has a small brewer exception).
130 See generally Sorini, supra note 22 (noting there are thirty-four states that
use a good cause model without any exceptions common among minority states).
131 E.g., id. (observing that Hawaii has not adopted a beer franchise law).
132 See generally id.
124
125
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cause model and the problem it creates.133 Section III.B explains
the various approaches the growing minority of states have taken
with respect to beer franchise laws.134
A. The Good Cause Model
Thirty-four states impose a regulatory structure that requires good cause to terminate a beer distribution agreement.135
In recent years, states like New York, Washington, and California
have evaluated implementing good cause requirements but decided against them.136 Good cause is a high bar to meet because
it traditionally requires a brewer to show the distributor failed
to substantially comply with the contract’s lawful requirements
and imposes a sixty-day window to cure the noncompliance.137
Common characteristics in the majority approach include:
written notice of termination, opportunity to cure, no termination from a change in ownership, and a few other limitations on
litigation and attorney’s fees.138 The burden to prove all of these
requirements falls squarely on the brewer’s shoulders.139 Additionally, the good cause requirement permits a distributor the
right to receive post-termination compensation from the terminating brewer.140
Infra Section III.A.
Infra Section III.B.
135 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
136 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c(4)(c)(i) (McKinney 2013) (enacting a small brewer exception to good cause requirements in 2013); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 19.126.020(10) (West 2009) (expanding its small brewer
exception from 50,000 barrels to 200,000 barrels in 2009); see also CAL. BUS.
& PROF. CODE § 25000.7(a)–(b) (West 2020) (adopting a beer franchise law in
2000 that did not contain a good cause requirement).
137 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 20020.
138 See Sorini, supra note 22 (listing Alabama, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky,
Michigan, and thirty other states who have a good cause requirement and
some combination of the other requirements listed in the text above).
139 E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 703 (West 2020) (“[N]o certificate of approval holder or manufacturer shall cancel, terminate, or refuse to continue a
franchise, or cause a wholesale dealer to relinquish a franchise, ... unless good
cause is shown to exist.”).
140 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2553(a), (c)(1)–(5) (West 2019) (“[T]he
franchised distributor whose franchise is threatened shall be entitled to recover
damages from the franchisor .... includ[ing], but shall not be limited to, ... [a]
133
134
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Good cause requirements have produced a perverse result: a distributor need only exhibit minimum effort in its contracts because statutory hurdles impair the brewer’s ability to
terminate the agreement.141 This allows distributors to turn the
marketing spigot on or off for a given brand on a whim.142 Laws
that require good cause often permit a distributor to sell its distribution rights, subject to the brewer’s approval; but brewers do
not have the same right.143 A beer distribution agreement regularly persists through the sale of a brewery.144 These same beer
franchise law provisions even permit a beer distribution agreement to survive the death of the brewer.145 Ultimately, good cause
requirements impact smaller brewers much more than their larger
counterparts because small brewers cannot typically buy their
way out of such contracts.146
The good cause model not only harms independent craft
breweries, but it is bad for the consuming public as well.147 Indeed,
the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice
Antitrust Division have explained that good cause requirements in
the beer context are “likely to diminish competition between ... beer
wholesalers and increase manufacturers’ costs of obtaining distribution services from wholesalers; these effects, in turn, are likely to
raise the costs of beer distribution.”148 Accordingly, consumers are
fractional portion of the franchised distributor’s tangible assets[;] ... [l]oss of
good will; ... [l]oss of profits[;] ... [a]ll other damages allowed under the law of this
State; and ... [t]he reasonable counsel fees and expenses incurred in the action ....”).
141 See Sorini, supra note 22 (listing sixteen highly restrictive characteristics that are common to a “full-fledged beer franchise law[ ]” that make it incredibly difficult for a brewer to terminate a distribution agreement).
142 Reyes Beverage, supra note 77.
143 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18B-1305(d)(3)–(7) (West 2019) (“Good
cause ... does not include ... [a] change in the ownership of [the brewery,] ...
brand[,] ... [or] right to distribute a product[;] ... [s]ale or transfer of the rights
to manufacture, distribute, or use the trade name of the brand to a [new] supplier[; f]ailure of the wholesaler to meet standards of operation or performance
that have been imposed ... unilaterally by the supplier[;] ... [t]he establishment of
a franchise agreement between a wholesaler and another supplier[; or t]he
desire of a supplier to consolidate its franchises.”).
144 Id. § 18B-1305(d)(4).
145 Id.
146 Reyes Beverage, supra note 77.
147 See Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3, at 1.
148 Id.
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likely to see increased costs for beer under a good cause model.149
The FTC and the DOJ further explained that the proposed California good cause requirement would lessen competition among
wholesalers and brewers alike.150 Wholesaler competition would be
lessened because once a brewery signs the distribution agreement,
it would be nearly impossible to terminate, and the distributors
would have little incentive to compete to sell a given brewery’s
brands.151 In other words, distributors would be free to focus
their attention on some brands while ignoring others, but the
ignored brewery would not be able to terminate the contract.152
Recognizing that a statutory good cause requirement would likely
“affect small brewers to a greater extent than larger brewers,”
the FTC noted that consumers “may find the variety available to
them diminished.”153
Ultimately, the FTC and the DOJ concluded in a March 20,
2020 letter to Assembly Member Jim Wood that California’s current good cause bill, AB 1541, “is likely to impede competition in
California beer distribution, to the detriment of California consumers. We see no countervailing consumer protection ....”154 Accordingly, states that already have good cause statutes or those
states considering them should review and reject such protectionism. Good cause requirements are bad for independent craft
breweries, competition, and the consuming public.155
B. Minority Approaches
There are three distinct minority approaches to beer distribution agreements, and they all have one commonality—they
do not have a blanket good cause requirement.156 This growing
minority permits brewers to terminate distribution agreements
without good cause much like any run-of-the-mill contract.157
Id.
Id. at 8–9.
151 See id.
152 See id. at 11–12.
153 Id. at 9.
154 Id. at 13.
155 Id. at 12–13.
156 See discussion infra Sections III.B.1, III.B.2, III.B.3.
157 See, e.g., N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c(4)(c)(i) (McKinney 2019) (exempting small brewers from good cause termination requirements in 2013).
149
150
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Section III.B.1 describes how some states exempt small brewers
from their good cause requirement.158 Section III.B.2 explains
how other states require something less than good cause—just
cause.159 Section III.B.3 discusses Wisconsin’s no-cause approach
to beer franchise laws.160
1. The Small-Business Exception
Colorado, Indiana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Washington,
and—more recently—New York adopted an approach to terminating a beer distribution agreement that exempts small brewers.161
At their cores, states that employ a small business exception are
still rooted in the good cause model; they simply exempt small
brewers from those requirements.162
Oklahoma expressly exempts small brewers from the good
cause termination requirements if they produce fewer than
25,000 barrels of beer a year.163 That is a large amount of beer.
According to the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau
(TTB), in 2019, 4577 of the 6400 breweries in the U.S. produced
less than 1000 barrels of beer, and only 102 brewed between
15,000 and 30,000 barrels.164 Similarly, New York also exempts
small brewers from good cause requirements; however, it defines
a small brewer as one that produces fewer than 300,000 barrels
of beer annually.165 Lastly, both of these states require a small
brewer to pay the distributor fair market value for the lost distribution rights.166
While large manufacturers possess the financial resources
to terminate distribution agreements, smaller brewers do not.167
Infra Section III.B.1.
Infra Section III.B.2.
160 Infra Section III.B.3.
161 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37A, § 3-111(F)(1) (West 2019); N.Y.
ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c(4)(c)(i).
162 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37A, § 3-111(B)(1)(a)–(d), (F)(1) (containing the requirements good cause, distributor notification, failure to cure, and
certified notification of noncompliance); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c(4),
(4)(c)(1) (requiring good cause, prior notification, and failure to cure).
163 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37A, § 3-111(F)(1).
164 ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE BUREAU, supra note 15.
165 N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c(4)(c)(i).
166 Id.; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37A, § 3-111(F)(1).
167 See Gerhart, supra note 17, at 28.
158
159
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The FTC points out that large manufacturers are “in a better
position to incur the legal and regulatory costs of termination,
and may thus have a greater ability to exercise control over
wholesalers.”168 This approach avoids the disparate impact on
smaller brewers by not binding them to the same good cause requirements as large manufacturers.169 Beer distribution laws with
a small brewer exception address the problem of powerful, large
manufacturers while avoiding the opposite problem of empowering distributors over craft brewers.170
2. The Just Cause Model
This model requires something less than good cause before a brewer may terminate a distribution agreement.171 It can
be less restrictive than the majority approach because it might
not contain various good cause staples like notice or cure requirements.172 However, it is more strict than other minority
approaches because it implements statutory requirements before any brewer may terminate a beer distribution agreement.173
One example of this model is Missouri—a state that defines good cause as substantial noncompliance, bad faith, or that
a governmental entity suspended the distributor’s license for a
minimum of thirty-one days.174 Missouri uses a watered-down
good cause requirement because a brewer may terminate a distribution agreement if the circumstances satisfy any one of the
elements as opposed to the standard requirement that all elements are met.175 Under Missouri law, there are far fewer termination requirements than traditional good cause states, but
all brewers—regardless of size—are subject to the statute.176
Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3, at 9.
See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37A, § 3-111(F)(1); N.Y. ALCO. BEV.
CONT. LAW § 55-c(4)(c)(i).
170 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37A, § 3-111(B)(1)(a)–(d), (F)(1); N.Y.
ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c(4), (4)(c)(i).
171 See MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.413(5)(1)–(3) (West 2019).
172 See id. § 407.413(2), (5)(1)–(3) (containing no notice requirements).
173 See id. § 407.413(5)(1)–(3).
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 Compare id., with N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c(4)(c)(i) (McKinney
2019).
168
169
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This approach appears to be a middle ground between
empowered brewers and empowered distributors. However, this
approach does not fully address the power that large manufacturers have over distributors.177 While the good cause model
does address that problem, it is too broad in its application.178 Here,
a less-than-good cause approach is just as broad, but it does not
do enough to address the problem of onerous burdens on independent breweries looking to terminate contracts with poorly
performing distributors.179
3. The Wisconsin Model
Wisconsin turns both the majority and other minority approaches on their heads. More closely aligned with California’s
current approach, a Wisconsin brewer may terminate its distribution agreement without good cause.180 That is where the similarities end.181
In Wisconsin, a brewer does not pay a terminated distributor
the fair market value of the contract.182 Rather, the successor
distributor—or the brewer’s new distributor—pays the fair market value penalty to the terminated distributor.183 If there are
multiple successor distributors, the new distributors divide the
fair market value payment equally.184 Lastly, if the brewer paid
any termination fees to the terminated distributor, the successor
distributor deducts that amount from its payment to the terminated distributor.185
The Wisconsin model addresses the good cause approach’s
ancillary problem in a novel way—it shifts the cost of terminating
a beer distribution agreement from brewers to distributors.186
Although this approach ensures terminated distributors receive
See generally MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.413.
See generally N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c.
179 See generally MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.413.
180 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 125.33(10)(4)(b), (c)(1)–(4) (West 2019).
181 See Glazer, supra note 30, at 24 (observing that a brewer in Wisconsin
can usually terminate a distribution agreement “for any, or no, reason”).
182 See id.
183 See id.
184 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 125.33(10)(4)(b).
185 See id.
186 Id.
177
178
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compensation for their loss, it does not address the CBBD’s concerns.187 Wisconsin shifts the burden of compensation away from
brewers and places it on distributors’ shoulders.188 If anything,
this approach tries to deter the circumstances that lead to the
problem without touching the problem itself.189
IV.CALIFORNIA: EMBLEMATIC OF THE BREWING INDUSTRY
California currently fits into an amorphous category—
comprised of six states—that has some beer distribution agreement
laws that fall short of requiring good cause while still providing
protections to distributors.190 More specifically, current California
law, only restricts termination “solely for a beer wholesaler’s failure
to meet a sales goal or quota that is not commercially reasonable
under the prevailing market conditions.”191 If the big distribution lobby has its way, AB 1541 will make it far more difficult
for independent breweries to terminate a contract.192
The CBBD’s justification for proposing AB 1541 is the
same as when it proposed California’s current beer distribution
agreement law in 2000.193 That justification also aligns with the
majority of states’ justification for requiring good cause.194 In
short, the justification is that brewers have too much power over
distributors.195
AB 1541 would align California’s beer distribution laws with
the majority approach by restricting brewers from terminating a
distribution agreement for anything less than good cause.196 Today,
See Gray Telephone Interview, supra note 103.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 125.33(10)(4)(b).
189 See id.
190 See Sorini, supra note 22.
191 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7(a) (West 2020).
192 See A.B. 1541, 2019–2020 State Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1–2 (Cal. 2019) .
193 Compare S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 1957, at 1–3 (Cal. Aug. 29,
2000) (stating “the purpose of this bill is to help restore balance in the relationship
between beer manufacturers and distributors/wholesalers by requiring that
contractual requirements regarding sales goals and quotes be commercially
reasonable”), with Gray Telephone Interview, supra note 103 (discussing the
CBBD’s position arises from large brewers—namely Constellation Brands—
having too much power over their distribution counterparts).
194 See Sorini, supra note 22.
195 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
196 See A.B. 1541 at 3–4.
187
188
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California is at a crossroads between its current beer franchise
laws, its history of proposed changes to those laws, and CBBD—
who is continually pushing the state toward the majority, good
cause approach.197 Section IV.A discusses California’s current beer
distribution franchise laws.198 Section IV.B explains the history
of those laws.199
A. Current California Law: Senate Bill 1957 and Business and
Professions Code Section 25000.7
Prior to 2000, brewers and distributors were free to contract without government intervention.200 The CBBD sponsored
Senate Bill (SB) 1957 during the 1999–2000 legislative session
to counterbalance the disparate bargaining power between brewers
and distributors.201 It justified the law by explaining how powerful brewers had forced distributors into unfavorable contract
terms and could terminate those agreements with little recourse.202
California’s Governor Gray Davis signed SB 1957 into law despite
the Small Brewer’s Association contending the bill contravened
the principle of freedom of contract.203
SB 1957 added two provisions to the Business and Professions Code.204 First, Business and Professions Code section
25000.7(a) (SB 1957 codified) states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any agreement for the sale
or distribution of beer between a beer manufacturer and beer
wholesaler, no sale or distribution agreement shall be terminated solely for a beer wholesaler’s failure to meet a sales goal
or quota that is not commercially reasonable under the prevailing market conditions.205

Compare CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7(a) (West 2020), with A.B.
1541 at 1–2.
198 Supra Section IV.A.
199 Supra Section IV.B.
200 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7(a) (beginning in 2000, instituting the first and only limitation on terminating beer distribution agreements
in California).
201 See A.B. 1541 at 1.
202 See S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 1957, at 1–3 (Cal. Aug. 29, 2000).
203 Id. at 4.
204 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7 (West 2020).
205 Id. § 25000.7(a) (emphasis added).
197
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Second, it defined a “beer manufacturer” as any holder of
a brewer’s license—whether it be in-state or out-of-state—or any
licensed importer.206 Ultimately, SB 1957 limited the circumstances
under which a brewer could terminate a distribution agreement.207
This statutory change handed distributors a distinct market advantage over manufacturers in 2000.208 Despite the fact
that sales are the sole reason for a manufacturer to enter a distribution agreement, disallowing termination for poorer than
expected sales crucially hamstrings small manufacturers. That
is, if the distributor underperforms on its end of the bargain,
that is not grounds for the brewer to terminate the contract.209 In
reality, other reasons to terminate a distribution agreement pale
in importance compared to sales from the manufacturer’s perspective.210 In addition, this change made it exceedingly more expensive for brewers to terminate unsavory distribution contracts,
rendering termination impossible for most small manufacturers.211 Litigation over the term “commercially reasonable” would
be difficult and expensive to prove and would almost certainly be
a question for the jury.212 Accordingly, this change removed the
main reason a brewer would want to terminate a distribution
agreement—poor performance—and it effectively took away the
means to do so by making it too difficult and expensive for a
brewer to even attempt termination.213
Today, the CBBD believes SB 1957 (now Business & Professions Code section 25000.7) did not go far enough in addressing
Id. § 25000.7(b).
Id. § 25000.7(a).
208 See generally id.
209 See id.
210 See Ohlhausen FTC Letter, supra note 103, at 4–5 (speaking to the different interests and incentives of distributors and manufactures).
211 See James A. Brickley et al., The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws, 34 J.L. & ECON. 101, 113 (1991) (“[A]nalysis of the case law
supports [the premise] that termination laws increase the costs of termination and nonrenewal.”); Tracey A. Nicastro, How the Cookie Crumbles: The
Good Cause Requirement for Terminating a Franchise Agreement, 28 VAL. U.
L. REV. 785, 796–98 (1994) (cataloguing several courts’ interpretations of
“good cause” that limit a franchisor’s ability to terminate franchisees).
212 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7(a).
213 See id.
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the alleged power imbalance between brewers and distributors.214
The CBBD raised the issue of beer distribution agreements once
more when it proposed a good cause requirement to Assembly
Member Gray early in the 2019 legislative session.215 Assembly
Member Gray eventually amended an existing bill to include the
CBBD’s requested changes.216 According to Assembly Member
Gray’s Office, the CBBD sought to change California’s distribution laws after Constellation Brands, a truly gigantic manufacturer, forced four distributors to sell their distribution rights to
Constellation products in 2018 and 2019.217
B. Pushing California Toward a Good Cause Requirement
California did not have any laws specific to beer franchise
agreements from 1933 until 2000.218 The first law it enacted
opened the door for future attempts to further regulate these
agreements.219 Section IV.B.1 discusses good cause legislation
that a California senator nearly amended in 2005.220 Section
IV.B.2 explains how the circumstances surrounding that 2005
legislation resulted in similar, current legislation in 2019.221
1. AB 417: The Proposed Franchise Act That Never Was
In 2005, California Assembly Member Greg Aghazarian
proposed AB 417 to include flavored malt beverages in the statutory definition of “beer.”222 After the bill reached the Senate,
Compare S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 1957, at 3 (Cal. Aug. 29,
2000) (“[T]he purpose of this bill is to help restore balance in the relationship
between beer manufacturers and distributors/wholesalers by requiring that
contractual requirements regarding sales goals and quotes be commercially
reasonable ....”), with Gray Telephone Interview, supra note 103 (proposing at
the CBBD’s behest for the same reasons that the CBBD cited in 2000).
215 Gray Telephone Interview, supra note 103.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 See generally CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7 (West 2020).
219 See id. (California Legislature’s first enacted statute pertaining to franchise laws in the alcohol industry).
220 Infra Section IV.B.1.
221 Infra Section IV.B.2.
222 A.B. 417, 2005–2006 State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (as amended
on Aug. 22, 2005, but not enacted).
214

2021]

INDEPENDENT CRAFT BREWERIES

429

Senator Wesley Chesbro drafted an amendment to the bill that
would tighten beer distribution laws in a manner similar to the
recently proposed AB 1541.223 Ultimately, that amendment never
became part of AB 417’s legislative record because Senator Chesbro
never proposed it.224
Before Senator Chesbro could amend AB 417, the Federal
Trade Commission explained how his proposed changes would
likely have catastrophic effects on California’s brewing industry.225 In that letter, the directors of policy planning, economics,
and competition advised Senator Chesbro to avoid adding a good
cause requirement to California’s beer distribution laws.226 The
directors identified a slew of problems that good cause requirements would create.227 Senator Chesbro never amended AB 417,
the Legislature passed Assembly Member Aghazarian’s version
of the bill, and Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed it.228
2. AB 1541: California Distributors’ Most Recent Attempt for
a Good Cause Standard
Fifteen years removed from AB 417, California has forgotten the lessons learned by its Legislature in 2005. The topic of
good cause beer franchise laws in California remains in dispute
because no official legislative record documented Senator Chesbro’s
efforts and lessons learned.229 The lack of a legislative record set
Compare Ohlhausen FTC Letter, supra note 103, at 2, with A.B. 1541,
2019–2020 State Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1–2, at 98 (Cal. 2019) (as amended on
July 11, 2019, but not enacted).
224 See generally Ohlhausen FTC Letter, supra note 103.
225 See id. at 3 (“One of [your] purported goals is to ‘foster vigorous and
healthy inter-brand competition in the beer industry.’ As explained below,
however, [your] Proposal is likely to have the opposite effect.” (internal citation omitted)).
226 Id. at 8.
227 Id. (citing a diminished ability to ensure distributors promote product,
increased beer costs, and decreased beer selection).
228 Compare A.B. 417, 2005–2006 State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (as
amended on Aug. 22, 2005, but not enacted) (passing the Legislature and
presented to Governor Schwarzenegger on Sept. 19, 2005), with Letter from
Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor, Cal. State, to Members of the Cal. Assembly (Oct. 07, 2005) (“I am returning AB 417 without my signature. This bill
would codify current law and practice to treat flavored malt beverages ... consistent with federal standards ....”).
229 See supra IV.B.1.
223
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the stage for AB 1541, which would align California’s beer distribution laws with the majority approach. This legislation would
restrict brewers from terminating a distribution agreement for
anything less than good cause.230
Under AB 1541, California’s beer distribution laws would
impose a four-step good cause process.231 First, the law would
adopt the substantial compliance model.232 Second, brewers would
need substantiating evidence and must give the distributor notice of termination.233 Third, the brewer must notify the distributor of termination within a specified time period—operating
much like a statute of limitations.234 Finally, the distributor
could provide a corrective action plan and cure the deficiency
within a specified period of time.235 A brewer may terminate a
distribution agreement only after it satisfies all four criteria,
barring the distributor does not cure the deficiency.236
V.PROPOSAL
Keeping the alleged problem—that large brewers have too
much power over distributors—in mind, the majority of states
have overcorrected to the good cause model.237 This model shifts
the balance of power strongly in favor of distributors, which is
likely to harm a state’s brewing industry, competition, and
therefore consumers.238 While this approach appears to address
the problem, it creates the opposite problem: distributors have
too much power over small brewers.239
States have realized the harm that the current good cause
requirement may bring, and the winds are shifting away from
that model.240 While the just cause and Wisconsin models impose a
A.B. 1541, 2019–2020 State Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 1 (Cal. 2019) (as
amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted).
231 Id. at 3.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 4.
235 Id. at 3.
236 Id.
237 See generally Sorini, supra note 22.
238 Ohlhausen FTC Letter, supra note 103, at 8; see Sayyed FTC Letter,
supra note 3, at 12.
239 See id. at 11–12.
240 See supra Section III.A.
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lighter requirement than the rigorous good cause model, neither
of these models address the problem.241 Under both of those
models, large manufacturers are still able to leverage their
strength over distributors.242
The small business exception adequately resolves the
problem without creating the ancillary problem that a pure good
cause model does.243 By exempting small brewers, a state can
still implement the rigorous good cause requirements without
impacting small, independent craft breweries.244 Further, the
small business exception is a dynamic alternative because it allows a state to specify the size requirements for a small brewer
and modify that threshold as it sees fit.245
If states implement the small business exception properly,
they would address distributors’ concerns—that brewers have
too much power over distributors—while not harming small
brewers or the independent brewing industry.246 This approach
focuses on the problem—how large manufacturers’ resources
permit them free reign in beer distribution agreements—but
avoids trapping small breweries in unbreakable pacts.247 Essentially, creating a small business exception insulates distributors
from the impact of large, globalized manufacturers that terminate distribution agreements.248 Distributors could rest easy
knowing large manufacturers cannot take advantage of them,
See supra Sections III.B.1–2.
See id.
243 See generally Benefits of Beer Franchise Laws, NAT’L BEER WHOLESALERS
ASS’N, https://www.nbwa.org/government/benefits-of-beer-franchise-laws [https://
perma.cc/KEM4-EFNP].
244 See supra Section III.B.1.
245 Memorandum from Beth Hatef of McDermott Will & Emery LLP on
Accommodation of Small Small Brewers in State Beer Franchise Laws, (July
2015) available at https://www.brewersassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015
/07/State-Law-Small-Brewer-Accommodations-Updated-7-27-2015.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2021).
246 See Ohlhausen FTC Letter, supra note 103, at 8 (noting that a good
cause requirement “may affect smaller brewers to a greater extent than larger
brewers, because larger brewers may be in a better position to incur the legal
costs of termination”).
247 Id.
248 See Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3, at 9.
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and small breweries would benefit from increased competition
and market growth.249
CONCLUSION
The main problem with the good cause model, as it pertains to independent craft breweries, is that the model seeks to
solve a power imbalance that simply does not exist between independent craft breweries and distributors.250 And while the
market power of large manufacturers might be harmful to distributors, one size does not fit all in this context.251 As the FTC
noted, the burdens that the good cause model imposes “upon
brewers do not seem calibrated to address any particular bargaining asymmetries between brewers and wholesalers, and we
are pessimistic that they could.”252
States should, in fact, engage in calibration. Legislatures
should re-examine their distribution laws to satisfy Big Distribution’s concerns of asymmetrical bargaining power with large
breweries, but states need not sweep independent craft breweries into that bin. It is time to stop taking the lobbyists’ words for
it. States must reject the good cause model to allow their independent craft breweries to thrive.
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